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IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABILITY IN MULTI-TIER SUPPLY 
CHAINS: STRATEGIES AND CONTINGENCIES IN MANAGING  
SUB-SUPPLIERS  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Buying firms must pay increased attention to supply chain sustainability issues as they might 
be held responsible by stakeholders for non-sustainable supply chain activities. Frequently, 
sustainability problems occur upstream at the sub-supplier level. Building on the literature on 
multi-tier supply chains (MSCs), we investigated the strategies of buying firms in the food, 
apparel, packaging, and consumer electronics industries to manage the sustainability of sec-
ond-tier suppliers and beyond. In particular, we analyzed seven cases of global MSCs and 
found four different characteristic MSC types—open, closed, third party, and “don’t bother”. 
We identified three main factors—supply chain complexity, the sustainability management 
capabilities of the first tier supplier, and the type of sustainability in focus (i.e., environmental 
or social sustainability)—that determine when and how buying firms actually extend their 
sustainability strategies to their sub-suppliers. 
 
Keywords: Sustainability, Buying Firm Strategies, Multi-tier Supply Chains, Case Studies  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Sustainability increasingly depends on the holistic implementation of practices beyond the 
boundaries of a buying firm (Glover et al. 2014, Golini et al. 2014, Schoenherr et al. 2014). 
Non-adherence to sustainability standards across lower tiers in the supply chain bears the risk 
of culminating in negative publicity for global brands. According to this “chain liability ef-
fect” (Van Tulder et al. 2009), buying firms can be held accountable for actions that take place 
within their globally dispersed supply chains (Reuter et al. 2010).  
 Non-sustainable actions that cause negative publicity for global brands are also frequently 
carried out by sub-suppliers. For example, in 2007, Mattel had to recall toys that were coated 
with toxic paint. An investigation revealed the source of this toxic paint was a subcontractor 
of Mattel’s first-tier (T1) supplier. Another example involves the parent company of the cloth-
ing and accessories retailer ZARA. Inditex was repeatedly denounced for “sweatshop-like” 
working conditions in the subcontractor facilities of AHA, ZARA’s main supplier (Butler 
2015). Although Inditex argued that it cannot be held responsible for AHA’s unauthorized 
subcontracting, Brazilian authorities responded that “[ZARA’s] raison d’être is making 
clothes (…) and it follows that it must know who is producing its garments” (Burgen & Phil-
lips 2011). These incidents highlight the growing necessity for buying firms to actively think 
about the management of both direct suppliers and sub-suppliers.  
However, implementing sustainability practices for sub-suppliers is a challenging task due 
to the lack of contractual relationships between a buying firm and its second-tier (T2) suppli-
ers (Choi & Linton 2011, Grimm et al. 2014). Initial studies have explored the different strat-
egies buying firms use to manage sub-suppliers, ranging from “delegating authority” (Choi & 
Hong 2002) to T1 suppliers for metrics such as quality, delivery, and sustainability (Choi & 
Linton 2011) to “closed triads” (Mena et al. 2013) in which buying firms directly manage 
sub-suppliers. Recent efforts to build a “theory of multi-tier supply chains” (Mena et al. 2013, 
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Wilhelm et al. 2016) have highlighted how these chains operate in terms of their structure, 
behavior, and performance (e.g., Mena et al. 2014, Tachizawa & Wong 2014) and have identi-
fied critical success factors for sustainability implementation (Grimm et al. 2014). 
While there seems to be an implicit assumption underlying these studies that firms “in-
creasingly extend (…) their reach deeper into the supply chain” (Mena et al. 2013: 59), in 
practice, managing sub-suppliers—particularly in the context of sustainability—is still the 
exception rather than the rule. The main reasons for this lack of control are constrained infor-
mation about the exact number or identity of sub-suppliers (Choi et al. 2001) and limited 
means to exert influence over them, as they often represent only a small percentage of the 
business of a lower-tier supplier (Plambeck 2012, Tachizawa & Wong 2014). The fact that 
sub-suppliers are also increasingly located in emerging economies that are geographically and 
institutionally distant compounds the challenge of managing such relationships (Awaysheh & 
Klassen 2010, Carter & Carter 1998). Consequently, there is a need to develop a better under-
standing about why and how buying firms extend their reach deeper into the supply chain. We 
are particularly interested in buying firms’ strategies and their underlying contingencies for 
managing sustainability in their multi-tier supply chains. The investigation of contingencies is 
important as it provides the necessary context for managers to allow them to implement the 
right strategies in their specific situations. Furthermore, it allows researchers to develop, test, 
and refine theories (Boyd et al. 2012). Therefore, our research questions are as follows: 
Which strategies do buying firms choose to manage sub-suppliers’ sustainability in different 
supply chains? Which contingencies determine the choice of a particular strategy?  
As little is known about the actual practices firms use to manage their sub-suppliers’ sus-
tainability in different supply chains, our paper is explorative with the aim of elaborating the-
ory (Ketokivi & Choi 2014). To this end, we study the sustainability strategies of four buying 
firms active in three different industries (food, apparel, and consumer electronics (CE)) in 
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seven multi-tier supply chains (MSCs) and explore the contingencies involved in managing 
sub-suppliers. Our findings contribute to MSC theory (Tse & Tan 2011), particularly in the 
context of sustainability. MSCs represent a helpful basis of analysis to study the challenges of 
extending sustainability to sub-suppliers (Grimm et al. 2014, Mena et al. 2014, Tachizawa & 
Wong 2014) as they constitute a middle ground by avoiding “some of the complexities of 
networks without the drawbacks of the dyad” (Mena et al. 2013: 59).  
In the following, we will first discuss the relevant literature relating to our research ques-
tions. We will then detail the research methodology leading to the data analysis section that 
comprises an intra- and cross-case analysis. Finally, we discuss our findings in light of exist-
ing research and develop research propositions before discussing the study limitations and 
recommending future research avenues. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Strategies for Extending Sustainability to Sub-Suppliers 
A growing body of research suggests that companies should expand their sustainability strate-
gies beyond the boundaries of their firm to the supply chain level (e.g., Brockhaus et al. 2013, 
Carter & Jennings 2002, Linton et al. 2007), including sub-suppliers (e.g., Choi & Linton 
2011, Tse & Tan 2011). We follow the widespread understanding of sustainability as the ex-
plicit consideration of social, environmental, and economic issues, commonly referred to as 
the triple bottom line (Bansal 2005, Dyllick & Hockerts 2002, Elkington 1997, Gimenez et al. 
2012). Sustainable supply chain management therefore comprises the “management of mate-
rial, information and capital flows as well as cooperation among companies along the supply 
chain while taking goals of all three dimensions of sustainable development, i.e. economic, 
environmental and social, into account which are derived from customer and stakeholder re-
quirements” (Seuring & Müller 2008: 1700).  
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However, it remains unclear how buying firms can implement sustainability standards and 
practices in light of the growing complexity of modern, globalized supply chains. As sustain-
ability risks usually originate from minor, less visible suppliers (Plambeck 2012, Roth et al. 
2008) that are “sheltered” from the glare of the general public (Lee et al. 2012), there is an 
increasing need to monitor sub-suppliers and incorporate the assessment of risks stemming 
from non-adherence to quality or sustainability standards into the supplier evaluation process 
(Tse & Tan 2011). Such risks of supply chain glitches that have particularly low “visibility” 
for buying firms, such as environmental pollution due to manufacturing or the use of child 
labor, can nevertheless cause huge chain liability effects and result in a negative reputation.  
Even though there is now agreement among supply chain management scholars that buy-
ing firms should manage sub-suppliers’ sustainability (Grimm et al. 2014), there is still little 
understanding about how this can be achieved. Mena et al. (2013) were the first to differenti-
ate between three strategies of extending sustainability to suppliers that result in different 
MSC structures. The “open” MSC is characterized by a structure with a linear flow of infor-
mation and products and no direct connection between the buying firm and the T2 supplier. 
This can, for example, mean that the buyer delegates the authority for managing T2 suppliers 
to the T1 supplier (Choi & Hong 2002; Wilhelm et al. 2016). In a “closed” MSC, the buying 
firm and the T2 supplier have established a mutual relationship that can be managed in a more 
formal or informal way. A “transitional” MSC establishes a middle ground and develops when 
the buying firm and the T2 supplier “stretch out to each other and begin building a link and 
initiating a move toward a ‘closed MSC’” (Mena et al. 2013: 62). This structure can be found, 
for example, in the practice of “directed sourcing” in the automotive industry (Choi & Hong 
2002). Tachizawa and Wong (2014: 651) later extended this typology to include “any lower-
tier supplier (i.e., so not only the second tier)” and added two types: “work with third parties” 
(such as NGOs, government, competitors etc.) and “don’t bother” (when the buying firm has 
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only an internal or first-tier supplier focus regarding sustainability). We will build on these 
typologies but explore their contingencies in more depth, that is, the contexts in which these 
approaches are chosen (Sousa & Voss 2008).  
 
2.2. Contingencies for Sustainable Sub-Supplier Management  
Despite the importance of the concept of managing sub-suppliers, we know little about which 
approaches buying firms are choosing in real life and the underlying contingencies of sustain-
able sub-supplier management. In the wider sustainable supply chain context—but not specif-
ically with respect to MSCs—Awaysheh and Klassen (2010) provide initial cues indicating 
when firms are more likely to engage in sustainability management of their next-tier supplier.  
 Awaysheh and Klassen (2010) look at the influence of supply chain structure—
operationalized as supply chain transparency, dependence between the firm and other mem-
bers of the supply chain, and distance among supply chain members—on the lead firm’s use 
of suppliers’ social sustainability practices, such as audits and codes of conduct. Dependence 
represents the degree to which a firm relies on other members of the supply chain for critical 
resources, components, or capabilities and influences a firm’s ability to control and stimulate 
change in its suppliers’ operations. There was only weak support for the hypothesis that de-
pendency on a customer would lead to increased use of socially responsible practices by the 
focal firm; the effects of supplier dependence were unclear. Distance encompasses three sub-
dimensions: geographical, cultural, and organizational distance. Organizational distance, 
measured by the total length of the supply chain, particularly results in firms making use of 
multiple suppliers’ social sustainability practices, “as having more tiers in the supply chain 
translates into greater complexity and uncertainty” (Awaysheh & Klassen 2010: 1260). More-
over, greater supply chain transparency in terms of product visibility by the end consumer has 
been related to increased emphasis on human rights to avoid any media scandals.  
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 Building on their work, but not specifically in the multi-tier context, Hoejmose et al. 
(2013) take a deeper look at the role of power in shaping socially responsible supply chain 
management practices. Their study confirms that relative buyer power enhances a firm’s abil-
ity to implement socially responsible supply chain practices and can also create a multiplier 
effect such that the influence of buyers on suppliers can force sub-suppliers to act in a respon-
sible manner. Their study moreover reveals that jointly dependent relationships (i.e., power 
symmetries) are strongly and positively associated with the implementation of socially re-
sponsible supply chain practices as the development of trust and partnership becomes more 
likely. Jointly dependent relationships also generate a sense of common purpose, as the expo-
sure to risk associated with irresponsible supply chains will affect both buyer and supplier in 
such cases. This is in line with previous findings that the reputational vulnerability of mem-
bers of a supply network and the distribution of power among them will lead to the higher 
propensity of a network to introduce an ethical sourcing code of conduct (Roberts 2003).  
 As a related topic, Wilhelm et al. (2016) analyze three MSC cases where the buying firm 
has chosen to delegate the responsibility for managing sub-suppliers’ sustainability to the T1 
supplier. Drawing on central constructs of agency theory, such as incentive structures and 
information transparency, they investigate the conditions under which the T1 supplier will 
accept this new role. The perspective taken here is, thus, the one of the supplier and we know 
little about the contingencies that lead to different MSC choices of the buyer other than dele-
gating sustainability management tasks to the T1 supplier.   
 Another important basis for our study is the groundwork provided by Tachizawa and Wong 
(2014). Based on a systematic literature review, several contingency variables for managing 
sustainability in MSCs are identified that could inform our study, such as a lead firm’s power, 
stakeholder pressure, industry, material criticality, dependency, distance, and knowledge re-
sources that determine the approach chosen by the buying firm to manage the sustainability of 
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lower tier suppliers. Despite the novelty of their work, their variables do not always seem to 
capture the multi-tier context adequately, which makes further in-depth investigation neces-
sary. “Knowledge resources” in Tachizawa and Wong’s framework, for example, refer to the 
technical expertise to manage the sustainability of suppliers but is only conceptualized at the 
level of the buying firm, when it could also become more relevant at the level of the T1 sup-
plier. Suggestions for further research are also formulated on a global level (e.g., “Power, 
stakeholder pressure, material criticality, industry dynamism/pollution level, dependency, 
distance and knowledge resources determine the approach chosen by the lead firm to manage 
the sustainability of lower-tier suppliers.”) (p. 657). Moreover, Tachizawa and Wong’s (2014) 
study focuses only on environmental sustainability, reflecting its current dominance in sus-
tainable supply chain studies, whereas social sustainability remains under-researched 
(Gimenez et al. 2012, Seuring & Müller 2008). However, initial evidence points at the fact 
that social sustainability might be more difficult to manage (Ashby et al. 2012) and that its 
link with performance is more difficult to establish (Gimenez & Tachizawa 2012).  
 Therefore, we see a  need for a more fine-grained, empirically grounded study about man-
aging sustainability in MSCs to provide a more solid conceptualization of each contingency 
and of their possible influence on the buying firm’s managing approach. By further exploring 
the contingencies identified in the literature in a real-life setting, we aim to verify, refine, and 
inductively identify further contingency variables that we link to actual strategies chosen by 
firms in different industries. In addition, we aim to more systematically compare the social 
and environmental dimensions of sustainability and their implications for managing MSCs.  
 
3. METHODS 
The main goal of this study is theory elaboration (Ketokivi et al. 2014). In particular, we seek 
to validate and refine the contingencies identified in our literature review and to introduce 
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new ones (for a similar approach see Ketokivi 2006) based on abductive reasoning (Locke et 
al. 2008).  
 Apart from enabling scholars to study a phenomenon in its natural setting, a case study 
approach (Dubois & Araujo 2007, Meredith 1998) allows for a richer understanding of the na-
ture and complexity of the phenomenon under investigation (Benbasat et al. 1987, Stuart et al. 
2002). More importantly, when compared to other large-scale theory-testing methods, the case 
study method provides the unique ability to get closer to the theoretical constructs and to un-
cover underlying causal relationships (Siggelkow 2007). In order to ensure validity and reliabil-
ity, we applied the measures highlighted in Table 1; these will be explained in detail in the follow-
ing paragraphs. 
=== Insert Table 1 about here === 
 
3.1. Theoretical Sampling 
Using a theoretical sampling approach, we began our case selection by identifying industries that 
are characterized by an increased need to improve environmental and social sustainability in 
global supply chains. The sampling process involved a three-step selection process—industry 
selection, buying firm selection, and supply chain selection—using a set of criteria. In particu-
lar, the food, apparel, and CE are industries in which consumers, NGOs, and other stakeholders 
exert high pressure on buying firms to implement network-wide sustainability (e.g., Lee & Kim 
2009, Maloni & Brown 2006, Rv & Kolk 2001, Yu 2008). We assumed that focal firms are in-
creasingly held responsible for their sub-suppliers’ actions (cp. the chain liability effect). We 
concentrated on a list of potential firms in those industries that lead sustainability-related rankings 
and listings, such as the UN Global Compact (UNGC), the Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(DJSI), the Fair Labor Association (FLA), the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), and the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI). These rankings often integrate measures of whether the focal firm 
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extends sustainability to their direct suppliers (e.g., DJSI, FLA). Although the management of 
sub-suppliers in terms of sustainability is not separately listed, we assumed that the more highly-
ranked companies are generally more likely to actively pursue a sustainability strategy, and also 
extend their standards to sub-suppliers. 
In order to increase comparability, we focused our search on firms of similar size with head-
quarters in Europe (due to similarities in regulations) and a global scope in terms of their supply 
chains. A selection of similarly ranked companies was contacted, and four firms from three differ-
ent industries (food, apparel, and CE) agreed to participate in our study. All firms are large, well-
known multinationals with an annual turnover of over 10 billion USD. We selected 1–2 direct 
purchasing categories from each buying firm’s sourcing portfolio with the assistance of the 
heads of purchasing. As a general criterion categories were supposed to be significant in terms 
of the firms’ total spend.  
Finally, we chose a key T1 supplier for each category with the help of the purchasing man-
ager of the selected category. We assumed that the characteristics of the T1 supplier, such as 
existing capabilities regarding the management of sustainability, are influential in determining 
which multi-tier strategy would be followed by the buying firm for the respective supply 
chain. Moreover, we sought to validate the insights we gained from the buying firms through 
interviews with those suppliers that play a more active role in the buying firm’s sustainability 
program. We therefore decided to focus on the most important suppliers in terms of purchas-
ing spend (over 20% of the category spend) and longer business relationships (more than four 
years). If several suppliers fitted these selection criteria, we opted for the supplier with the 
highest purchasing spend. In total, we sampled seven MSCs, which lies within the often suggest-
ed sample size of 4–10 cases (e.g., Eisenhardt 1998).  
 
3.2. Data Collection 
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For every sampled supply chain case, semi-structured interviews with key informants (e.g., 
chief procurement officer (CPO), purchasing manager, sales manager, or sustainability man-
ager) from the buying firm and the T1 supplier were conducted. For the interviews, we adopt-
ed questions from previous research in the field of buyer–supplier relations and sustainable 
supply chain management (e.g., Chen & Paulraj 2004, Vachon & Klassen 2006, Wu & Choi 
2005, Wu et al. 2010, Zhu & Sarkis 2004). Interviews were conducted in English, German, 
and Chinese. Given the sensitivity of the data provided, all contacts were requested not to 
mention their company’s name or the supplied product. Therefore, the case descriptions and 
Table 2 include only anonymous information for the sampled firms, which we labeled Educa-
ta, Sequenzia, Integris, and Electra, and their respective supply chains.  
=== Insert Table 2 about here === 
 
The interviews generally lasted one hour on average and were carried out by a team of three 
researchers. Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed afterwards. In total, we conducted 61 
interviews at two levels of the MSCs of the four buying firms. We triangulated the insights 
gained from the interviews with several alternative data sources to increase internal validity: 
(1) corporate materials from all network partners, such as annual reports, homepages, and 
other Internet sources, (2) corporate sustainability reports, publications concerning sustaina-
bility initiatives, (3) other documents provided by the interview partners, including audit tem-
plates and evaluation documents, and (4) additional background interviews with NGOs, such 
as the Clean Clothes Campaign and Rainforest Alliance. The additional background inter-
views were specifically used to check if firms acted in the way they indicated in the inter-
views (see Table 3). We mainly checked if the external view of firm practices and the internal 
views were consistent; in most instances, this was indeed the case. In case external views did 
not jive with the internal perspectives, we fed back external assessments from NGOs to the 
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firm interviewees, thus provoking further discussion. The more balanced description that we 
received through this interviewing technique allowed us to more confidently assess the seri-
ousness of the buying firms’ endeavors to improve sustainability in their supply chains. 
=== Insert Table 3 about here === 
 
3.3. Data Analysis 
Our analysis consisted of two major steps. The within-case analysis allowed us to understand sin-
gle firm approaches in depth, whereas the cross-case analysis was instrumental in identifying 
common patterns across cases. We began by writing up within-case descriptions. We tried to gen-
erate internally consistent descriptions of each case, capturing all relevant information about the 
buying firm’s management of indirect supplier relations with respect to sustainability. Next, we 
carried out open coding of the interviews and arranged the codes into categories. This was fol-
lowed by axial coding. Axial coding allowed us to root our data analysis in theory and helped to 
refine our concepts, leading to better reliability of the data (Wuttke et al. 2013). More specifically, 
we looked for the contingency variables outlined in our literature review, which often required 
major adjustments. For example, stakeholder pressure was less relevant because, due to our sam-
pling approach, all buying firms were exposed to similar degrees of regulatory pressure. There-
fore, we adjusted the variables where necessary (e.g., the “knowledge resources” relating to man-
aging suppliers’ sustainability proved to be less relevant at the level of the buying firm but more 
relevant at the level of the T1 supplier, which we relabeled as “sustainability management capabil-
ity”, and distance was less relevant in terms of geographical and cultural distance but was more 
relevant in terms of institutional distance). Finally, we developed additional contingency varia-
bles, either inductively or by comparing our emerging codes with existing concepts in the litera-
ture. This allowed us to validate supply chain complexity, which is an important contingency 
in terms of the buyer’s choice of MSC strategy. We followed Choi and Hong (2002) in their 
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conceptualization of supply chain complexity, where vertical complexity refers to the number 
of tiers in a system, and horizontal complexity refers to the number of suppliers in each tier.  
 In Table 4, we describe each major category and its operationalization and link them to the 
corresponding literature. Even though some of these dimensions, such as MSC complexity, only 
emerged during the case analysis, we list the operationalization of all our constructs for ease of 
readability of the case descriptions.  
=== Insert Table 4 about here === 
 
 During each step, one member of the research team who was not involved in the first round of 
data analysis verified the patterns and themes identified. We discussed differences in perceptions 
among the members of the research team throughout the process until final agreement was 
achieved. In very rare instances in which no agreement could be achieved, the data was not con-
sidered further in the analysis. This helped to improve reliability and resulted in a jointly shared 
picture of the analysis. In the following section, we present an overview of our within-case and 
cross-case analyses of the seven supply chains. 
 
4. WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS 
Sequenzia  
Sequenzia is a large multinational food brand that has set a target to source 100% of their agricul-
tural raw material sustainably by 2020. Sequenzia expects all suppliers to either be certified by a 
recognized global organization, such as Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade, or the Marine Stewardship 
Council, or be assessed against Sequenzia’s own code. Sequenzia has formulated its own sustain-
ability code that comprises 11 key indicators, each focusing on a specific area of sustainable farm-
ing, such as soil health, pest management, and energy consumption, and people management. The 
code is “dynamic” as it contains both mandatory and highly desirable practices that could become 
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mandatory in the near future. We investigated two of Sequenzia’s supply chains, one for dairy 
products (DP) and one for tea bags (TB), which we illustrate in Figure 1.  
=== Insert Figure 1 about here === 
 
Sequenzia Dairy Products  
Sequenzia sources DP such as processed milk, cream, and butter from about 20 large cooperatives 
and 40 privately owned firms based mostly in Europe. The cooperatives and firms source raw 
milk from about 100,000 smaller privately owned farmers. We conducted interviews at one pri-
vately owned dairy processing firm in France and one Dutch cooperative that also processes milk 
in their own factories. Sequenzia highlights the fact that the high number of sub-suppliers at the 
T2 level makes it impossible for them to be in direct contact with all farmers, which increases 
their dependence on their key T1 suppliers if they want to reach their aim of sourcing 100% of 
their agricultural raw material sustainably by 2020:  
“(…) the average farm size in Europe is about 80 cows. It’s not one of these [huge] American farms 
with about 3000 cows. So, we source from quite a large number of farms, we therefore have (…) to 
reach out to each and every one of them, and that’s the challenge, and we can only do that via our sup-
pliers, via the dairies, and to get them on board and to convince them that this is the way to go and [ask 
them] whether they will join us on this journey” (Sequenzia DP, Purchasing Manager). 
 
Sequenzia trains the T1 supplier’s farm advisors (i.e., agronomists) with regard to Sequenzia’s 
sustainable agricultural code and provides them with extensive implementation guidelines. Sup-
pliers were requested to implement the sustainability practices at their farmers’ operations and to 
perform audits every 18 months. Audits were carried out by farm advisors: 
 “We are not doing the audit ourselves. What we do is that we initially work with the suppliers and their 
farm advisors. It is up to the suppliers to make sure that what they supply to us is sustainable. And we 
have trained them, or their farm advisors, regarding our code. (...) So once the benchmark is done and 
improvements are made, there are self-assessments, how we call it, (…) of the farms by the suppliers. 
So it is based on trust, you could say.” (Sequenzia DP, Purchasing Manager). 
 
 The cooperatives were already quite advanced in this regard, and most have set up their own 
sustainability programs. The Sequenzia purchasing manager emphasized that the geographical 
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location of the entire supply base in Europe (resulting in a low institutional distance) also contrib-
uted positively to their sustainability practices because there were strict environmental regulations 
to which suppliers must adhere and control mechanisms behind them:  
“I guess in Europe, we are quite lucky in that sense. I think it will probably be more of a challenge in 
the Asia Annex, for example, but in Europe, what we see are the big companies, the big dairies, already 
having their own sustainability agenda and the targets in place.” (Sequenzia DP, CPO) 
 
 Not least due to the training provided to their farm advisors, the T1 suppliers possessed a high 
degree of knowledge about farmers’ processes, and we found evidence for a high level of compe-
tence regarding sustainability management among Sequenzia’s T1 suppliers as they “translated” 
the buying firm’s general guidelines into more operational, specific instructions for farmers. As 
Sequenzia’s agricultural code was originally designed for farming and not animal husbandry, the 
requirements for food and water provision for animals, animal health, and animal medication 
treatments were formulated on a more general level. The T1 supplier, that is the dairy producer, 
further specified these requirements for cow husbandry at its dairy-supplying farms, including 
regular checks of cow alimentation, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow dis-
ease), the isolation of sick cows, and maintenance of the farm’s surrounding area.  
 
 The Dutch cooperative had developed particularly strong competencies for sustainability man-
agement based on its various experiences with its broad customer base and had proactively for-
mulated its own sustainability program:  
“Many companies are struggling with what is sustainable. A lot of them don’t know what they are talk-
ing about. For example, XY, another customer of ours, is not as advanced in their sustainability pro-
gram as Sequenzia, or as we are. As we are more proactive in this area, we have actively approached 
XY to adopt our sustainability standards, and they were happy about that.” (Sequenzia DP_T1_B, Key 
Account Manager) 
 
 In contrast to the French T1, the Dutch cooperative was also powerful enough to reject the 
firm-specific sustainability requirements of Sequenzia when they did not fully overlap with the 
requirements of other customers, thus reflecting power symmetries between the buyer and T1:  
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“Sequenzia is a customer, but there are others. We will not confront farmers with individual demands 
from just one customer.” (Sequenzia DP_T1_B, Key Account Manager) 
 
 Sequenzia was well aware of this challenge:  
“…and what the challenge is for the dairies that they don’t want to be having something specific for 
Unilever, something specific for Nestle, something specific for Danone. (…) So, for the dairies, what’s 
probably challenging is to get them to do something specific for us.” (Sequenzia DP, CPO) 
 
 
Sequenzia Tea Bags  
Sequenzia sources tea globally from traditional tea growing countries such as Indonesia, India, Sri 
Lanka, and Tanzania. Sequenzia introduced the Rainforest Alliance certification to their TB brand 
in 2010, with a target to source all tea from certified farmers by 2015. In the region of Kenya (the 
geographical area for which our interview partner is responsible), tea is sourced from approxi-
mately 40 tea processing firms, agents, or auctions that source tea leaves from up to 600,000 small 
farmers.  
Tea is a typical commodity that is traded in auctions. However, in the past years, Sequenzia 
had been shifting purchasing volume from tea auctions to direct sourcing from farmers or through 
their agents, which cuts out the middlemen. In addition to a higher transparency concerning the 
origin of the tea, a major reason for this strategic change was to offer economic incentives to im-
plement sustainability practices.  
Due to the large number of smallholder farmers at the T2 level, the high institutional distance 
between the buyer and T1 and T2 suppliers that were located in a developing country, the high 
complexity of the supply chain resulted in particular challenges in achieving a holistic implemen-
tation of sustainability. Therefore, Sequenzia chose to cooperate with one large tea cooperative 
that represented about 500,000 smallholder farmers in Kenya and sourced tea directly from them 
rather than through auctions. The cooperative owned 65 processing plants, each of which received 
tea leaves from approximately 8,000 farmers. This resulted in a high degree of inter-dependency 
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between the buyer and T1, as Sequenzia was an important buyer for the tea cooperative that pur-
chased about 60% of the supplier’s output. At the same time, Sequenzia also sourced 50–60% of 
its tea through the cooperative and because it had advertised that its tea is certified 100% sustain-
able, it was also dependent on having a strong partner in Kenya: 
“Sequenzia Tea_T1 is one of our biggest suppliers. So if we want to achieve our target to source all the 
ingredients for our tea bags sustainably, we have to get Sequenzia Tea_T1 certified; otherwise, we will 
never make it. They are a major, major supplier for our brand. (…) There has always been a business re-
lationship, but it has only become extremely strong in the last couple of years (….)” (Sequenzia, TB 
Operations Manager) 
 
At the same time, there were power asymmetries between the multinational company Sequen-
zia and the developing country cooperative that mainly represents smallholder farmers.  
Instead of relying on self-assessments, the Rainforest Alliance, a global third-party organiza-
tion, certified farmers’ sustainability compliance. Certification was valid for three years, but audits 
took place annually. Financial support for certification and training was mainly provided by Se-
quenzia but also by other sources, such as regional development funds. At the outset, Sequenzia 
had built up knowledge resources for managing farmers’ sustainability by training their own 
agronomists in Kenya to bring them up to speed with Rainforest Alliance standards.  
“When we started the process of getting Rainforest Alliance certification, the first thing we had to do 
was to understand what standard was required and adapt that for tea. (…) We got our own people up-
skilled so we understood what it was all about, and then on the basis of that, our own personnel were the 
first to start training our suppliers in Rainforest Alliance certification requirements because they were 
the most knowledgeable, because they understood tea and they understood standard requirements. So, 
for a number of years, the most qualified group of trainers in Kenya for tea and links with Rainforest 
Alliance adaptation were Sequenzia people.” (Sequenzia TB, Supplier Development Manager) 
 
Subsequently, knowledge resources were passed on to the next tier by training agronomists of 
the tea cooperatives who in turn trained so-called “lead farmers”, who were usually farmers with 
above-average tea management capacities. Finally, lead farmers trained farmers regarding the 
sustainable agriculture standards and conducted internal inspections at the farm level prior to au-
dits. Rainforest Alliance certification was awarded to a factory after a positive group audit (that 
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included all farmers who deliver to the factory). In 2015, Sequenzia reached its target of certifying 
all its farmers.  
 
4.2. Educata 
Educata, another multinational food brand, faces challenges similar to those of Sequenzia. The 
company has set itself the goal of enhancing sustainable agriculture through a 15% reduction of 
its carbon footprint, a 15% reduction in water usage by changing from “flooded fields” to grid 
irrigation, and a 5% increase in crop yields by developing special seeds.  
 Educata has developed a “sustainable agricultural farming manual” that covers the regula-
tion of the use of fertilizer and pesticides, allowed seeds, water usage, food safety, personnel prac-
tices, genetically modified crop control, transportation, and farmer improvement. Educata applies 
high standards regarding the use of pesticides, and farmers are “restricted to only 20% of the pes-
ticides allowed by the EU”. We investigated two supply chains, one for vegetables (VT) and one 
for metal product packaging (PP). As the structure of the supply chain resembles those of DP, we 
only illustrate the PP supply chain in Figure 2. 
=== Insert Figure 2 about here === 
 
Educata Vegetables  
 We investigated a supply chain for a type of vegetable that accounts for over 60% of Edu-
cata’s purchasing volume. The supply chain for Educata VT was recently reduced from 15 to 10 
T1 suppliers, again resulting in lower supply chain complexity and high interdependencies be-
tween the buyer and T1 supplier. The majority of suppliers were located in Southern Europe and a 
smaller fraction was located in North America; therefore, the institutional distance between buyer 
and supplier was low. We interviewed two T1 suppliers, one located in Portugal and one in North 
America. Each supplier sourced raw vegetables from approximately 100–300 farmers. In addition 
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to consolidating purchasing volume, a major reason for cutting down the number of T1 suppliers 
was to gain more control over the supply chain. Long and stable relationships existed with T1 
suppliers, some lasting over 40 years. At the same time, there was an ongoing consolidation at the 
farmer level. Most T2 suppliers were large professional farmers with over 10,000 acres of 
land. Their sustainability capabilities were generally assessed to be very high by the lead 
firms. 
 In order to improve the understanding of the product itself and its final manufacturing 
process, Educata regularly invited its key suppliers (4–5) to its facilities and visited the fields of 
the top farmers with them. The aim was to encourage a holistic understanding of the origin of the 
products, their final processing, and the particular importance of agricultural processes.  
 Some activities directly involved the T2 level. During the crop season, Educata’s buyers 
regularly visited the field to “not lose contact with the farmers” (purchasing manager VT_A). 
Educata employed a team of 40 global agronomists that regularly visited the farmers’ fields and 
supported the agronomists of the T1 suppliers (called field reps) in their work: 
“What we would typically do is to have sessions with the field reps of the first tier suppliers. (…) We 
constantly look at developing tools that we can use with our suppliers that help them to think differently 
about risks in the field (…) and from my perspective, you can judge your supplier on how proactive 
they are. If you ask a question on something that is relatively new in the industry and you have a suppli-
er that goes: ‘Yeah, we are aware of that, and we’ve got some things that we are working on. It leaves 
you feeling a lot better than a supplier who writes it down and says: ‘I go and have a look at it.’” (Edu-
cata VT, buying firm, Purchasing Manager)”. 
 
 Due not least to the training, both interviewed T1 suppliers were active in terms of sus-
tainability beyond the relationship with the customer, engaged in industry initiatives and 
roundtables, and had set up their own programs to improve environmental performance. Their 
capabilities to manage sub-suppliers’ sustainability were therefore quite developed. Three to 
four times a year, T1 suppliers audited farmers’ compliance regarding specified sustainability 
indicators, such as the type of seed or the amount of water used. T2 suppliers needed to docu-
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ment sustainability indicators in a field book that was checked by the T1 supplier “3–4 times a 
year as well as a soil and water analysis once a year” (interview VT_A, T1 supplier). In addition, 
the T1 supplier took samples of all farmers’ deliveries that were checked for pesticides by external 
laboratories. Educata only checked the field book in case of irregularities, and the T1 supplier 
could be made accountable for incomplete or false information from the T2 supplier. Overall, the 
level of MSC transparency was assessed to be high by the buyer.  
 
Educata Product Packaging  
 For PP, Educata aimed to halve the waste associated with its products by 2020 by increas-
ing the use of recycled and renewable materials and by decreasing the use of materials, for 
example, by reducing the thickness of packaging. Although PP was not a core product for 
Educata, the purchasing spend was high for this category. The PP supply chain was highly 
consolidated with five suppliers and 10 T2 suppliers (i.e., metal foil producers). The reasons 
for this low horizontal complexity at both tiers are the high requirements regarding specifica-
tions (e.g., size, can ends, and thickness) of the product that only few suppliers were able to 
fulfill, thus increasing dependence on single suppliers:  
“It is a big spend with a very consolidated supply base and because we have done so much work on re-
ducing can weight and size for costs and sustainability reasons. For one product, our specification are so 
strict that there is only one supplier that can supply our particular size and thickness of can ends.” (Edu-
cata PP, Purchasing Manager) 
 
 The supply base was entirely located in Europe, thus eliminating institutional distance. 
The transparency of the supply chain was assessed to be very high by the buying firm, as 
there was intense research and development (R&D) collaboration for improving sustainability 
between Educata and its T1 suppliers:  
“Our suppliers have got some in-depth knowledge on sustainability which we do use. Our R&D col-
leagues work closely with them on the down-gauging projects, reducing the composition of metal com-
ponents and they are working on better ways to recycle products as well.” (Educata PP, Purchasing 
Manager) 
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 Although the T1 suppliers’ general capability for sustainability was assessed to be very 
high, T1 suppliers were not allowed to change sub-suppliers without prior written agreement 
from Educata who regularly requested sustainability related information on T2 suppliers from 
the T1, such as existing certifications or their CO2 footprint.  
 
 As a result, T1 suppliers were actively pursuing their own sustainability agenda and were, 
for example, conducting regular life cycle analysis together with T2 suppliers for selected 
product categories. In fact, the interviewed T1 suppliers defined sustainability as one of the 
core areas where they could demonstrate their competitive advantage: 
“Companies like Nestle or Unilever want to understand the whole supply chain. And if you are not able 
to answer questions on sustainability, not just in terms of marketing but in terms of concrete projects, 
you easily end up in a category that has nothing to do with the premium strategy we follow as a suppli-
er.” (Educata PP_T1, Purchasing Manager)  
 
Integris Apparel 
Triggered by various incidents in the apparel industry with high media coverage, such as the 
collapse of Rana Plaza and worker strikes in Cambodia in 2013, apparel firms such as Integris 
have become highly sensitive about sustainability issues and have tried to increase public trust 
by publishing extensive information about their activities on their website. Integris has issued 
three detailed manuals on social standards, environmental standards, and health and safety 
standards, as well as detailed guidelines for their implementation. We investigated two major 
supply chains—one for clothing (CL) and one for footwear (FW)—that are structured and 
organized very similarly. Therefore, we report on them together (see Figure 3). 
=== Insert Figure 3 about here === 
 
Integris Clothing and Footwear  
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 In the CL supply chain, Integris sourced fabrics from 70 suppliers. Twelve were considered 
key suppliers, with 10 located in emerging markets such as Vietnam and Cambodia. The 
number of T2 suppliers was estimated to be as high as 28,000. The FW supply chain was 
slightly less complex with 20 T1 suppliers, five of which were considered key. All were based 
in emerging markets. The number of T2 suppliers was approximately 8,000, so that the hori-
zontal complexity in both supply chains was very high at the T2 level.  
Although it was common practice in the apparel industry to follow price-driven purchasing 
practices and to frequently switch suppliers, Integris tried to build long-term relationships with 
suppliers, some of them existed for over 30 years. As Integris accounted for a large share of 
their sales volumes, resulting power asymmetries between the buyer and T1 suppliers were never-
theless high.  
Integris encouraged its T1 suppliers to demonstrate their transparency regarding sustaina-
bility in their facilities. A list of all T1 suppliers was published on the website, and some sup-
pliers uploaded their own sustainability reports. Integris set well-specified sustainability targets 
in both extended supply chains, and there was a clear idea about the driving role of the buying 
firm:  
“I think the initiative has to come from us. We have to say exactly what we want. And this is the way it 
works in many areas of supplier management where we say, as the brand, what we expect from our 
suppliers. And suppliers should actually be thankful about this and act according to our expectations” 
(Integris FW, Purchasing Manager). 
 
Up until that point, the supplier sustainability management capabilities of T1 suppliers had 
not been assessed as high, which is why Integris conducted all training and audits by itself:  
 
 “Our suppliers are not comparable to those in the automotive industry. They are not on a level of a 
Bosch or Johnson Control and the level of production capacity planning or strategy development is ra-
ther limited, to put it carefully. (…) The same goes for sustainability, at least at the moment” (Integris 
FW, Purchasing Manager) 
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Therefore, the brand employed a team of 12 full-time auditors who conducted factory au-
dits in eight main sourcing regions. In 2014, Integris audited over 330 facilities, with the large 
majority belonging to T1 suppliers and some belonging to T2 and T3 suppliers. Audits took 
place regularly in a time span of eight months to two years, depending on the initial audit rat-
ing of the supplier.  
The company’s auditing focus was on major suppliers in terms of purchasing volume at the 
level of T1 suppliers and beyond. As a general rule, a T1 supplier could only source major materi-
als from a T2 facility if it has been previously audited by Integris. For certain issues, such as child 
labor, the company had a “zero tolerance” policy that led to immediate termination of the relation-
ship, but most other negative audit results required the supplier to implement rapid improvements.  
 Parallel to the audits, Integris offered training to its major T1 suppliers on topics such as waste 
reduction, energy efficiency, and gender equality and standardized reporting according to GRI. 
Sustainability training was organized for groups of T1 suppliers but often also involved T2 sup-
pliers. On average, a T1 supplier received at least 3–4 training sessions per year. In addition, In-
tegris organized a one-day “sustainability roundtable” for each geographic region where 60–90 T1 
and T2 suppliers jointly discussed sustainability-related topics. Our informants from Integris 
announced their intention to provide more training to T1 suppliers to enable them to take 
more responsibility for the sustainability management of sub-suppliers in the future.  
 
Electra  
 Electra is a member of the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and adopts 
the EICC Code of Conduct as a standard to help manage supplier sustainability. The EICC 
Code of Conduct specifies requirements on labor practices, health and safety, environment, 
management systems, and ethics. Electra had set a target for itself that by 2015, 80% of its T1 
suppliers should be compliant with the EICC Code of Conduct. To achieve this target, Electra 
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had set up a supplier sustainability office with 11 sustainability experts, eight of which are 
located in China. Each expert was responsible for the sustainability performance of a group of 
suppliers. The office provided trainings to help suppliers better understand EICC require-
ments. We investigated the supply chain for preassembled parts and components for CE, which is 
illustrated in Figure 4.  
=== Insert Figure 4 about here === 
 
Electra Consumer Electronics  
CE parts were sourced from over 400 T1 suppliers, 60 of which were classified as important, in-
dicating high horizontal complexity. Audits were conducted for many suppliers that were located 
in a “high-risk” country, such as China or India, and when the purchasing spend exceeded one 
million Euro. We investigated seven T1 electronics component suppliers within this supply chain. 
Their long-standing business relationships with Electra and their experience with several audits 
helped them to build sustainability capabilities for their own operations:  
 “Our customers have become more stringent in their sustainability requirements, such as working hours 
and emergency preparedness. Along with the stricter requirements, we are also becoming more experi-
enced in coping with these audits. We know these requirements better after these audits (…). We have 
developed our understanding of social responsibility in this process; otherwise, we would have no idea 
about the EICC codes of conduct.” (Electra CE_T1_C, General Manager Assistant). 
 
 Audits took place every three years and were carried out by a third party. Suppliers’ non-
compliance with the EICC Code of Conduct resulted in a corrective action list. Suppliers that 
failed to resolve major non-compliance issues within the timeframe faced the risk of being phased 
out from Electra’s supply base.  
 Electra did not directly manage the sustainability performance of its sub-suppliers. In 
2013, Electra introduced the responsibility of managing next-tier suppliers’ sustainability as 
an audit criterion for T1 suppliers. Since then, T1 suppliers needed to provide evidence that 
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“the EICC code requirements have been communicated to the next-tier suppliers” and that “an 
effective process to ensure that the next-tier suppliers implement the code is in place” (Electra 
supplier sustainability audit tool, 2013). However, as Electra did not provide any clear im-
plementation guidelines, there was little clarity about this issue. In an EICC training session 
for T1 suppliers that one of the authors attended in April 2014, many suppliers raised ques-
tions how they should extend sustainability requirements to their next-tier suppliers:  
 “(…) Suppliers can send emails and draft supplier sustainability protocols to inform their next-tier sup-
pliers about the EICC Code of Conduct. Conducting supplier sustainability audits is encouraged but not 
required for tier-one suppliers (…)” (Electra CE, Supplier Sustainability Manager). 
 
Most T1 suppliers restricted their activities to merely informing suppliers about the EICC 
requirements but did not see it as their responsibility to actually monitor their compliance. 
One major reason for T1 suppliers’ reluctance to become more active at the T2 level was the 
lack of resources, indicating a lower capability for managing sub-suppliers’ sustainability. 
Whereas T1 suppliers had dedicated quality managers for their own operations who could 
also be sent to their suppliers’ facilities, the role of a dedicated sustainability manager was 
undefined. Most of the T1 suppliers assigned these responsibilities to the general manager and 
the operational manager who were already struggling to implement sustainability require-
ments in their own operations as part of fulfilling their daily tasks.  
 “We have more approximately 200 suppliers. How many people do we have in our firm for manage-
ment systems? We have in total three part-time managers doing this… We do not have the time and re-
sources to enforce these requirements as Gamma is doing…” (Electra CE_T1_F, HRM Manager) 
 
 Another problem was decreasing power asymmetries between T1 and T2, either because 
the T2 supplier was much larger in size or because T1 suppliers were concerned about finding 
alternative supply sources that were able to deliver parts of sufficient quality at low prices:  
 “We are hesitating to extend the EICC codes of conduct because many suppliers will not accept our 
request at all. We are motor producers, and we use a lot of copper and steels. These components are 
provided by two Chinese giants. We are a trivial customer to these suppliers. They even reject our quali-
ty and process improvement requirements. How can we enforce stricter requirements on social respon-
sibility?” (Electra T1_E, General Manager) 
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 Oftentimes the T1 was very aware about possible sustainability non-compliance instances 
at the T2 level:  
 “We pay more attentions to quality-related issues. By contrast, it is out of our scope to check how much 
money our suppliers pay their employees (…). We know that our suppliers have problems with over-
times. What can we do about that? We can find another supplier with less overtime, but this supplier 
will be more expensive (…). And our customer will not accept such a cost increase.” (Electra CE_T1_C 
General Manager Assistant) 
 
As there were practically no interactions taking place between the sustainability managers at 
Electra and the T2 level, the buyer was not well informed about any non-compliance instanc-
es, and the level of MSC transparency was low.  
 
5. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS  
As we expected based on our theoretical sampling approach, all multinational companies in 
our sample were active in extending sustainability to their T1 suppliers. All companies also 
made efforts to consolidate their supply base and build long-term, collaborative relationships 
with selected suppliers. However, we observed differences regarding the management of sub-
suppliers. While all investigated buying companies have recognized the importance of manag-
ing sub-suppliers’ sustainability, the approaches they chose ranged from a very hands-on ap-
proach in the apparel supply chain to a complete delegation of sustainability tasks to T1 sup-
pliers in the packaging, food, and consumer electronics supply chains. In order to identify 
patterns in the contingencies of sub-suppliers’ sustainability management, we compared the 
cases for similarities and differences. We reorganized cases according to five industry sectors 
that we linked to the MSC archetypes (Mena et al. 2013, Tachizawa & Wong 2014). Based on 
our theoretical pre-conceptualizations and additional themes that emerged from our data (see 
Table 4), we were able to compare our cases in terms of five key variables, as presented in 
Table 5. We will explain these patterns in the following.  
=== Insert Table 5 about here === 
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One interesting finding was that four of the seven investigated cases (VT, DP, PP, and CE) can 
be classified as open MSC structures, meaning that the buyer delegated all or part of the sub-
suppliers’ sustainability management to the T1 supplier. In the CE case, the delegated authori-
ty for sustainability management tasks to the T1 suppliers took place in a less informed way, 
as the buyer did not ensure that the T1 had acquired sufficient capabilities for this additional 
task. In particular, a dedicated sustainability expert was missing, which can be seen as an in-
dication that the T1 suppliers’ sustainability management capabilities were less developed. As 
China was considered a high-risk country by Electra, characterized by high institutional dis-
tance, the high degree of delegated authority reflects a “don’t bother” approach (see Tachiza-
wa & Wong 2014). For the other three cases, the T1 supplier sustainability management capa-
bilities were highly advanced, and there was often a dedicated expert (e.g., in the form of an 
agronomist) in place. Moreover, the T1 suppliers demonstrated proactive behavior in dissemi-
nating sustainability upstream.  
Similar to CE, the apparel supply chains (CL & FW) were characterized by high complexi-
ty and focus on emerging countries, resulting in high institutional distances between the buy-
ing firm and its supply base. As a result, clothing companies like Integris not only make major 
investments in strengthening the sustainability capabilities of their T1 suppliers but also par-
ticipate directly in the selection, training, and auditing of T2 suppliers, as is typical for a 
closed MSC.  
 In extremely fragmented supply chains like we found with TB where suppliers are largely 
located in developing countries with high institutional distances, buying firms collaborated 
with third-party certification organizations, such as the Rainforest Alliance, Fairtrade, or 
UTZ. This “work with third parties” MSC structure is typical for managing sustainability for 
tropical commodities such as tea, coffee, and cocoa. This variation of a closed MSC structure 
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allows multinational firms to delegate assessment tasks and some training tasks to third par-
ties that are more experienced and efficient in the implementation of sustainability at the 
farmers’ level and that can also help to increase legitimacy with external stakeholders. 
 
6. DISCUSSION  
While all buying firms in our sample have recognized the importance of managing the sus-
tainability of sub-suppliers, it was the aim of this study to identify the contingencies that ac-
count for the strategy that buying firms take to manage sustainability in their multi-tier supply 
chains. Our study was able to validate some of the contingency variables outlined in the exist-
ing literature and identify some new contingencies, such as the sustainability management 
capabilities of the T1 suppliers and the triple bottom line focus (environmental or social sus-
tainability). In the following, we will develop propositions regarding the interplay of contin-
gencies and MSC strategies based on the patterns we identified in our cross-case analysis. 
Subsequently, we will discuss our insights in light of the existing literature.  
  
6.1. Strategies and Contingencies for Managing Sustainability in MSCs 
Overall, we found support for the different strategies of managing MSCs, as postulated by 
Mena et al. (2013). This provides ample evidence that these strategies play an important role 
across diverse contexts. However, we would like to add that the “don’t bother” MSC-type 
observed is the result of a planned strategy but rather emerges out of an uninformed delega-
tion of tasks. 
 As to be expected, institutional distance between the buying firm and its supply base mat-
tered for the choice of a MSC strategy, and we found an open MSC type only in those cases 
where the buying firm is sourcing from suppliers that operate in a tightly regulated environ-
ment (Europe and North America in our cases). For other categories such as apparel and con-
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sumer electronics sourcing activities shift increasingly to emerging countries, where high in-
stitutional distance often went in line with the perception of a ‘high risk’ sourcing country in 
terms of sustainability. While buying firms naturally dedicate more attention to suppliers in 
these countries and increase their sustainability management efforts in the supply chain, this 
does not necessary imply that they take a direct approach in managing sub-suppliers, resulting 
in a closed MSC. In this context, our cases show that horizontal complexity (Choi & Hong 
2002) was found to be an important contingency for a buying firm’s strategy to manage sus-
tainability in its MSC. A low level of horizontal complexity at the T1 level resulting from the 
buying firm’s efforts to consolidate supply chains enabled the delegation of sub-suppliers’ 
sustainability management tasks, even when horizontal complexity at the T2 level was high, 
as the case of Sequenzia TB demonstrates. However, the case also showed that a high level of 
horizontal complexity at the T2 level in addition to high institutional distance posed consider-
able challenges in managing an MSC that might not be mastered by actors in the supply chain 
on their own, even if the buying firm and T1 suppliers would share this responsibility. This 
necessitates the involvement of third parties. A high level of horizontal complexity at the sub-
suppliers’ level (T2 suppliers and beyond) therefore influences the choice of a certain MSC 
strategy more than horizontal complexity at the T1 supplier level, leading to our first proposi-
tion:  
 Proposition 1a: A low level of horizontal complexity at the T1 level facilitates the delega-
tion of sub-suppliers’ sustainability management tasks, leading to an open MSC, but only 
when institutional distance is low.  
 Proposition 1b: The higher the level of horizontal complexity at the sub-suppliers’ level, 
the more likely the involvement of additional (external) parties, leading to a “work with third 
parties” MSC, particularly when institutional distance is high.   
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 As expected, power played an important role, but rather than traditional purchasing power 
(in terms of the sales dependency of a supplier on a particular customer), the dependency of 
the buyer on a T1 supplier as an agent to disseminate the buyer’s sustainability policy up-
stream was crucial to understand which MSC strategy the buyer chose. This dependency—
and therefore supplier power—seems to be positively related to higher horizontal complexity 
at the T2 level, as observed in the dairy, tea, and apparel cases.  
 Proposition 2a: The higher the horizontal complexity at the T2 level, the higher the de-
pendency of the buyer on a particular T1 supplier to disseminate sustainability upstream and 
the more likely “delegated authority” becomes, leading towards an open MSC.  
 Moreover, contrary to common assumptions (e.g., Van der Vaart & Van der Donk, 2004), 
we found one case where power asymmetries increase towards the T2 level rather than de-
crease, leading to difficulties implementing sustainability strategies upstream. The case of 
Electra CE showed that T1 suppliers often found it hard to switch supply sources that were 
able to fulfill both the quality as well as cost criteria, and thus had very little leverage to en-
force sustainability requirements. In these cases, the risk of T1 suppliers “decoupling” (Erics-
son & Svensson 2015; Wilhelm et al. 2016) their delegated authority from their actual en-
gagement in managing sub-suppliers becomes high.  
 Proposition 2b: In the case of increasing power asymmetries upstream, the risk of T1 sup-
pliers decoupling the assigned delegated authority becomes high, leading to a “don’t bother” 
MSC.  
An important contingency variable that emerged from our data analysis and that was not 
considered in our theoretical pre-conceptualization is the ability of the T1 suppliers to manage 
the sustainability of sub-suppliers through collaboration and assessment activities that we 
termed “T1 sustainability management capability”, which is an important prerequisite for an 
open MSC. The capability seems to be highly related to the ability of the T1 supplier to im-
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plement sustainability in its own operation but does not necessarily overlap, as the CE case 
showed. The CE case also demonstrated that sustainability management capabilities are not 
necessarily connected to the ability to manage the quality of suppliers, as all investigated sup-
pliers generally performed well in this regard.  
 Proposition 3a: Strong T1 supplier sustainability management capabilities facilitate dele-
gated authority of managing sub-suppliers’ sustainability and lead to an open MSC.  
 Proposition 3b: Less developed T1 supplier sustainability management capabilities in-
crease the risk of a “don’t bother” MSC, even though the buyer intends to manage the MSC.  
Even though all firms in our sample pursued the triple bottom line in their sustainability 
activities, the type of sustainability targeted emerged from our data analysis as an interesting 
contingency that was strongly related to MSC transparency and that we defined here as the 
ability to detect suppliers’ non-compliance along the different tiers. Regarding environmental 
sustainability (that was predominantly pursued for DP, VT, PP, and TB), any misconduct of 
suppliers that contravened the code of conduct, such as the illegal use of pesticides or CO2 
emissions of farmers, was more easily detectable. Suppliers’ non-compliance with social sus-
tainability standards regarding, for example, child labor, sexual harassment, or excessive 
overtime is not traceable in end products and can often only be detected by experienced audi-
tors. Therefore, a more traceable form of sustainability makes it easier for the buying firm to 
delegate authority over sustainability management to the T1 supplier, as sustainability non-
compliance at the sub-supplier level becomes easier to detect.  
Proposition 4a: Non-compliance regarding environmental sustainability is more traceable 
and thus positively related to supply chain transparency, which is more likely to lead to a del-
egation of authority regarding sub-suppliers’ sustainability management to the T1 supplier, 
leading to an open MSC. 
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Proposition 4b: Non-compliance regarding social sustainability is less traceable and are 
thus negatively related to transparency, and is more likely to lead to a closed MSC.  
 
6.2 Contributions to the Field of Sustainable Supply Chains  
Our approach to consider the dimensions of the triple bottom line simultaneously revealed 
interesting differences between social and environmental sustainability with regard to a buy-
er’s choice of MSC strategy. We provided a partial answer to the question raised by Tachiza-
wa & Wong (2014) whether observed patterns of choices for MSCs might differ according to 
the type of sustainability. Our study provides strong indications of this. Inconsistent findings 
in past research (e.g., Wilding et al. 2012) might be based on this omitted consideration. We 
validate the earlier observation that the “more process-driven nature of environmental sus-
tainability makes it easier to put into supply chain practice” (Ashby et al. 2012: 497). We 
found that the differences between social and environmental sustainability are linked differ-
ently to MSC transparency. Of the two, noncompliance with environmental sustainability is 
easier to detect, as the illegal use of pesticides at the field level can be traced in samples, and 
the use of water and other natural resources is rigorously documented in field books. Con-
versely, overtime and sexual harassment issues remain “invisible.” As the link between the 
type of sustainability and supply chain transparency has been little discussed so far, our in-
sights provide an interesting starting point for future research.  
 Our study can be seen as complementary to similar studies in the rapidly emerging field of 
sustainability in MSC (e.g. Tachizawa & Wong 2014). We find support that no firm can be 
that omnipotent to orchestrate the entire MSC but that buying firms can and do exercise con-
trol even to the level of secondary suppliers through formalization and delegating authority. 
While previous studies have acknowledged that T1 suppliers can play an “active mediating 
role” in the management of sub-suppliers’ sustainability (Grimm et al. 2014), and explored 
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the conditions under which T1 suppliers will actually accept this new role (Wilhelm et al. 
2016), we provide another important building block for understanding the functioning of 
these supply chain structures based on delegated authority. By answering the question when 
buying firms choose to delegate responsibility for managing sustainability of sub-suppliers to 
T1 suppliers, we found that the delegation of authority is highly dependent on the T1 sustain-
ability management capabilities. The concept of sustainability management capability is gen-
erally under-conceptualized, and the few exceptions focus on the capability of suppliers to 
implement sustainability in their own operations (e.g., Fu et al. 2012, Lee & Klassen 2008, 
Wong et al. 2012). We found only one study that explicitly applies sustainability management 
capabilities to the level of sub-suppliers. Lee and Klassen (2008) conceptualize “environmen-
tal management capabilities” of small- and medium sized suppliers as five specific and inter-
related capabilities, one of them being the ability to motivate sub-suppliers to be environmen-
tally responsible and reduce the environmental burden caused by logistics. This ability comes 
closest to our idea of “sustainability management capability”, but our understanding of the 
concept is broader as it encompasses not only the environmental but also the social dimension 
because it goes beyond logistics. Notably, T1 suppliers’ sustainability management is, accord-
ing to our study, a key lever for managing complex upstream supply chains that has been 
overlooked to a large extent in the existing literature. This also opens up avenues for investi-
gating T1 suppliers’ capability building and supplier development, specifically in the context 
of disseminating sustainability along MSCs. 
As a further contingency, we validated the importance of supply chain complexity, which 
has often been linked to important supply chain performance dimensions, such as delivery 
performance (Milgate 2001, Vachon & Klassen 2002), manufacturing performance (Bozarth 
et al. 2009), supply chain flexibility (Blome et al. 2014), reliability (Adenso-Diaz et al. 
2012), customer-integration efficiency (Danese & Romano 2013), and the traceability of ad-
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verse events (Skilton & Robinson 2009). The effect of complexity on sustainability in supply 
chains has been less researched so far (exceptions are Awaysheh & Klassen 2010, Vachon & 
Klassen 2006), and even less in a multi-tier context. In this regard, our findings shed light on 
the sub-dimensions of structural complexity in sustainable MSCs. Further research could fo-
cus more on behavioral components that are connected to dynamic complexity. 
Finally, in the tradition of research on the role of power in supply chains (Benton & Maloni 
2005, Nyaga et al. 2013), our study highlights the role of power asymmetries along MSCs. 
While previous studies suggest that buying power creates a multiplier effect such that the in-
fluence of buyers on suppliers can force sub-suppliers to act in a responsible manner 
(Hoejmose et al. 2013), our findings revealed that this might not necessarily be true. As pow-
er asymmetries was found to increase upstream, this requires a closer look at behavioral as-
pects like supplier motivation.  
A practical implication from our study is that there are viable approaches for buying firms 
to deal with the complexity of their supply chains when they start assigning a more responsi-
ble role to the T1 supplier. This occurs when the buying firm builds more collaborative rela-
tionships with T1 suppliers, even if commodities are traded (see also Pagell & Wu 2009). In 
this respect, the MSC archetypes can also be interpreted as a sequential model of the devel-
opment of sustainability management of sub-suppliers. This also provides important ground-
work for the application of supplier development practices for practitioners. In cases of low 
sustainability management capabilities of T1 suppliers, a closed MSC seems most appropriate 
to control supply chain risks of sustainability non-compliance. Otherwise, focal firms will be 
held responsible for not sufficiently addressing sustainability issues in their supply base. This 
strategy, however, might come at a very high cost. Therefore, buying firms should try to in-
vest in long-term relationships with selected T1 suppliers to systematically develop their sus-
  
36 
 
tainability management capabilities. This illuminates the clear need for sustainability capabil-
ity building of suppliers in order to educate T1 suppliers as “sustainability disseminators”.  
 
7. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
Our study contributes to the rapidly growing literature on MSCs (Choi & Linton 2011, Mena 
et al. 2013), particularly in the context of sustainability (Grimm et al. 2014, Mena et al. 2014, 
Tachizawa & Wong 2014). We elaborate on the emerging theory in this field by providing 
more in-depth knowledge on the contingencies that influence how a buying firm manages 
sustainability beyond firm boundaries.  
 While the identification of novel concepts that emerge from data is a unique strength of the 
case study method, it is also connected to a number of limitations. First, we selected a set of 
multinational firms that were known to be advanced in terms of their sustainability strategies. 
While we could assume that all these firms are engaged in extending sustainability to their 
direct suppliers at least, they might not be representative in terms of buying firms’ strategies 
in each industry sector. More large-scale studies are needed to validate our insights to see if 
buying firms’ strategies of managing sustainable MSCs are more firm-specific or industry-
specific.  
 Second, as we selected multinational firms from the same region (Western Europe) in order 
to ensure comparable sustainability conditions, the results might be biased. For example, 
American or Chinese consumers might have different preferences for sustainability, and the 
legal environment might significantly impact which types of MSC management are pursued. 
Moreover, firms in Asia opposed to Western Europe might be located further up the supply 
chain, such that buying firms are closer to the origin of supply. This provides further avenues 
for research complementing and contrasting our “European” findings with findings from other 
regions, such as North America or Asia. Researchers might want to specifically target region-
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specific contingencies and the effects of crossing national boundaries with respect to MSC 
management. 
 Third, we operationalized MSCs as a three-tier structure, which allowed us to capture a 
higher level of the real-life complexity compared to the traditional buyer–supplier dyad, while 
simultaneously being aware of the simplifying nature of our approach. Although there is 
common agreement that MSCs are better characterized as “networks” with vertical and hori-
zontal linkages among actors (Choi & Hong 2002, Holweg & Pil 2008), there are still consid-
erable methodological challenges to overcome to consider the full complexity of real-life sup-
ply chains. Nevertheless, the simplified operationalization of the supply chain enables us to 
gain a deeper understanding with regard to our theoretical interest (i.e., contingency variables 
of buying firms’ strategies of managing sustainability in MSCs), but the application of addi-
tional methods, such as social network analysis, is desirable.  
 Fourth, we focused on a set of industries that is frequently studied in sustainability research 
where significant pressure to address several dimensions of the triple bottom line exists. Our 
selection of industries is by no means exclusive, and it would be interesting to see how buying 
firms in other industries such as the automobile industry (Simpson et al. 2007, Xia & Tang 
2011), the chemical industry (Foerstl et al. 2010), and the mineral industry (Epstein & Yutas 
2010), are currently coping with the need to make their sub-suppliers’ sustainable but that 
might be subject to different MSC contingencies (see also Fu et al. 2012). Specifically, the 
automobile industry is characterized by relatively long MSCs (Choi & Hong 2002) and a 
strong focus on the tangible aspects of sustainability. T1 suppliers in this industry usually 
have highly developed capabilities regarding the management of sub-suppliers and perfor-
mance criteria, such as quality and efficiency (Sako 2004), which could lead to different strat-
egies regarding the delegation of sustainability management tasks to them. Despite the limita-
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tions of this work, we hope that our suggestions for further research trigger additional studies 
in the area of MSCs, specifically in the sustainability context, to extend and test our ideas. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1: Validity and reliability issues addressed throughout the course of our researcha 
Reliability/Validity  
Criterion 
Research Phase 
 Design Case Selection Data Gathering Data Analysis 
Reliability  
 
 Develop case study protocol 
 Development and utilization of case 
study database 
 Selection criteria well documented in the 
case study protocol 
 Selection based on multi-step process 
(ranking as sustainability sector leader in 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index; listing in 
at least one other sustainability index, 
such as FTSE4Good; official commitment 
to the UN Global Compact; publication of 
sustainability reports according to the 
Global Reporting Initiative at least on a B-
Level; active involvement in the Carbon 
Footprint Disclosure Project; and three 
additional associations) 
 Semi-structured interview guide-
lines reported in case study pro-
tocol 
 All interviews transcribed by 
interviewers 
 Involvement of authors who have not 
been in the field gathering the data 
 Rigorous coding process 
Internal Validity  
 
 Foundation of our research model, 
previous literature, and a theoretical 
framework 
 
 Not applicable  Multiple respondents 
 Most knowledgeable key in-
formants interviewed 
 Pattern matching within and among 
cases 
 Triangulation of questionnaire, semi-
structured interview and secondary data 
 Active search for alternative explana-
tions 
Construct Validity 
 
 Adoption of questions from previous 
research in the field of sustainable 
supply chain management 
 No questions asked, which would 
involve broad speculation 
 Not applicable  Multiple sources of information: 
questionnaires, semi-structured 
interviews, databases, and re-
ports 
 Assured anonymity  
 Data triangulation based on independent 
sources 
 Data analysis in parallel with interview 
phase to be receptive to new results 
External Validity 
 
 
 Comparative multiple case studies 
 Theoretical sampling  Gathering data on the case con-
text 
 
 Consideration of case context 
 Comprehensive intra-case analysis 
 Pattern matching rather than statistical 
projections used 
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a based on Yin 2009; Gibbert, Ruigrok, and Wicki 2008 
TABLE 2: Overview of cases and interviews 
Supply 
Chain 
Purchasing 
spend for 
category in 
mn. Euro 
Share of 
emerging mar-
ket country 
sourcing  
Category  
description 
Company Company  
turnover  
in mn. EUR  
(rounded) 
Location Informant  Number of 
interviews 
DP 
Dairy 
200 0% 
Dairy products Buyer Sequenzia 40,000 Europe CPO, Purchasing Manager DP 3 
T1: Processed dairy  Sequenzia DP_T1_A 45  France CEO, Purchasing Manager 2 
T1: Processed dairy Sequenzia DP_T1_B 11,000 Netherlands Key Account Manager, Manager Coop-
erative Affairs, Manager Global Sus-
tainability Framework 
3 
TB 
Tea in bags 
and bulk 600 100% 
Tea bags Buyer Sequenzia 40,000 Europe Procurement 
Operations manager TB, 
Supplier Development 
Manager 
3 
T1: Processed tea Sequenzia TB_T1 30  Kenya Sales Manager 2 
  Certification body  Rainforest Alliance N.A. UK Manager Sustainable Agriculture Rela-
tions, Manager Tea East & Southern 
Africa and Asia 
2 
VT  
Vegetables 
100 > 10% 
Canned vegetables Buyer Educata 7,000 Europe 
CPO, Head of Sustainability, Purchas-
ing manager VT 
6 
T1: Processed 
vegetables 
Educata VT_T1_A 90 Portugal CEO, Purchasing Manager 2 
T1: Processed 
vegetables 
Educata VT_T1_B 80 
North 
America 
Corporate Quality Assurance Manager  1 
PP 
Product 
Packaging 
160 0% 
Product packaging Buyer Educata 7,000 Europe Purchasing Manager PP 2 
T1: Metal cans Educata PP_T1 2,000 UK Sales Manager, Purchasing Manager 2 
CL 
Clothing 300 <80% 
Clothing Buyer Integris 3,000 Europe Head of Sustainability, Purchasing 
Manager CL 
3 
T1: Clothing Integris CL_T1 35 Turkey Sales Manager  1 
FW 
Footwear 1,000 <90% 
Footwear Buyer Integris 3,000 Europe Head of Sustainability, Purchasing 
manager FW 
3 
T1: Footwear Integris FW_T1 110 China Sales Manager  1 
CE 
Consumer 
Electronics 
 
150 
 
<90% 
Consumer 
electronics 
Buyer Electra 25,000 Europe 
Purchasing Managers CE, Sustainabil-
ity Managers 
5 
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 T1: Assembled 
parts 
Electra_T1_A 4 China 
General Manager, HRM Manager, 
Sales Manager, Production Manager 
4 
 
T1: Assembled 
parts 
Electra_T1_B 22  China 
Management System Engineer, HRM 
Manager 
 
2 
 T1: Assembled 
parts 
Electra_T1_C 
 
24  China 
General Manager Assistant 
 
1 
 
  
T1: Assembled 
parts 
Electra_T1_D 250 China HRM Manager 
1 
 
  
T1: Assembled 
parts 
Electra_T1_E 6 China 
General Manager, Quality Manager, 
HRM Manager 
3 
 
  
T1: Assembled 
parts 
Electra_T1_F 60 China 
General Manager, HRM Manager, 
Production Manager, Administrative 
Manager, Key Account Manager 
6 
 
  
T1: Assembled 
parts 
Electra_T1_G 40 China 
General Manager, General Manager 
Assistant, Management System Engi-
neer 
3 
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TABLE 3: Additional interviews with NGOs and multi-stakeholder organizations 
Organization  Industry 
focus 
Aim of the organization Informant 
Fair Food International Food Improve the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable people in the global food system, such as workers (especially 
women) and smallholder farmers, promote the sustainable use of natural resources and preserve the environment.  
Director Policy and Ad-
vocacy 
China Labor Watch Consumer 
electronics 
Improve working conditions in the Chinese manufacturing industry by uncovering unethical labor practices through 
investigations and local union collaborations and organizing media campaigns. 
Program coordinator  
Ethical Tea Partnership  Tea Improve tea sustainability, the lives and livelihoods of tea workers and farmers, and the environment in which tea is 
produced by working with tea producers and smallholder farmers in supply chains to help them meet internationally 
recognized social and environmental standards.  
President 
Centre for Research on 
Multinational Corpora-
tions (SOMA) 
Tea Strives for global economic development that is sustainable and fair and the elimination of the structural causes of 
poverty, environmental problems, exploitation, and inequality. Through research targeted at achieving sustainable 
change and strengthening cooperation, SOMO seeks to offer social organizations worldwide, especially those in de-
veloping countries, the opportunity to promote sustainable alternatives and to provide a counterweight to unsustaina-
ble strategies and practices of multinational corporations. 
Senior researcher 
Clean Clothes Campaign Apparel Improve working conditions in the global apparel industry by uncovering unethical labor practices through investiga-
tions and local union collaborations and organizing media campaigns. 
Researcher and interna-
tional secretariat officer 
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TABLE 4: Operationalization of major constructs 
Category Definition Operationalization Source 
 
Supply chain 
complexity  
Different elements of a system that re-
quire coordination by the buying firm  
 
 
 
Vertical: Number of tiers 
 
Horizontal: Number of suppliers in each tier (0–10: very low, 11–100: 
low, 101–1000: high, >1,000 very high) 
 
Choi & Hong 2002; Awaysheh 
& Klassen 2010 
 
Choi & Hong 2002  
 
Institutional  
distance 
Distance between the home country 
institutions of two firms engaged in buy-
ing and supplying regarding voice and 
accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effec-
tiveness, regulatory quality,  
rule of law, and control of corruption 
 
Composite index based on the difference of each of the Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators of each sourcing country compared to the buying firms’ 
country. The deviations were corrected for differences in the variances of 
each dimension and then arithmetically averaged (0-0.5: very low, 0.5–2: 
low, 2-3.5: high >3.5: very high). 
Kogut & Singh 1988, The 
Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors 2015 
Transparency 
 
 
Instances where interview partners de-
scribed the degree to which non-
compliance is detectable along the dif-
ferent tiers of the MSC  
 
High, when the buyer frequently conducted audits at the T1 facility (at 
least 1 p.a.) and is able to gain insights regarding sustainability at the T2 
level (e.g. through third part audits, field books etc.)  
 
Mainly inductively generated 
T1 Supplier 
sustainability 
management 
capability  
Instances where interview partners de-
scribe the technical expertise of suppliers 
to implement sustainability in their own 
operations and/or to train their suppliers 
how to be sustainable and assist them in 
the implementation process  
 
High, when the supplier was able to conduct audits and/or training inde-
pendently, and when a dedicated expert for managing sustainability at the 
supplier was in place (e.g. agronomist) 
Mainly inductively generated 
 
 
 
Power asymme-
tries along the 
MSC 
Instances where interview partners de-
scribe differences in power, i.e. the de-
pendency of a firm on another member 
firm in the supply chain in order to reach 
its own aim  
 
Mainly based on anecdotal evidence and qualitative assessments of inter-
viewees 
Mainly inductively generated 
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TABLE 5: Cross-Case Comparison 
 Dairy Tea Bags Vegetables Product Packaging 
 
Apparel 
 
Consumer Electronics 
 
Supply chain Sequenzia DP 
 
Sequenzia TB Educata VT Educata PP Integris FW and CL Electra (CE) 
Sustainability focus Environmental 
 
Environmental Environmental Environmental Social Social 
MSC type Open MSC Third party Open MSC 
 
Open MSC Closed MSC “Don’t bother”  
Vertical complexity 2 tiers 
 
2 tiers 2 tiers 2 tiers 4 tiers 4 tiers 
Horizontal complexity T1: 60  
T2: 100,000  
T1: 350  
T2: 600,000 
T1: 10 
T2: 1000-3000 
T1: 6 
T2: 10 
T1: 70-80 
T2: >28,000 
 
T1: 450 
T2: Unknown 
Institutional distance 0.6: Mainly concentrat-
ed in Europe 
(Netherlands–Portugal) 
4.5: Developing coun-
try sourcing 
(UK–Kenya) 
0.6 and 0.25: Mainly 
concentrated in Eu-
rope/US 
(Netherlands–
Portugal/US) 
 
<0.1: Mainly concen-
trated in Europe 
(UK–Germany) 
4.3: Emerging country 
sourcing 
(Germany–Vietnam) 
4.8: Emerging country 
sourcing 
(Netherlands–China) 
MSC transparency 
 
High: 
 Annual audits of T1 
factories through 
lead firm  
 T2 audits take place 
every 18 months 
 Agronomists of lead 
firm regularly visit 
main farmers (T2) 
and have good in-
sights into farmers’ 
facilities 
 Extensive documen-
tation through farm-
ers’ field books, and 
the use of forbidden 
pesticides can be de-
tected through sam-
ple checks 
 
High: 
 Annual audits of T1 
plant and T2 farms.  
 Due to the nature of 
tea (quality can fluc-
tuate weekly), pur-
chasers regularly vis-
it tea farmers and are 
sensitized regarding 
sustainability issues. 
 
 
High: 
 Annual audits of T1 
factories through 
lead firm  
 Agronomists of lead 
firm regularly visit 
main farmers (T2) 
and have good in-
sights into farmers’ 
facilities. 
 Extensive documen-
tation through farm-
ers’ field books, and 
the use of forbidden 
pesticides can be de-
tected through sam-
ple checks. 
 
High: 
 R&D staff of T1 
supplier works on 
joint sustainability 
projects with buying 
firm.  
 Any changes in the 
sub-suppliers base 
need to be approved 
by the buying firm.  
Low: 
 Some issues of so-
cial sustainability 
non-compliance are 
hard to detect (e.g., 
underaged workers, 
sexual harassment). 
Audits take place 
every 3 years  
 Buying firm also 
audits selected T2 
facilities and thus 
possesses some in-
sight about sustaina-
bility issues at this 
level.  
Low: 
 Non-compliance 
against social sus-
tainability can gen-
erally be detected 
through audits (e.g., 
registration of work-
ing hours) 
 Buying firms audit 
T1 every three years 
 Buying firms possess 
no information on 
T2 sustainability 
compliance, and in-
teraction with T2 
level is sparse.  
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Supplier sustainability man-
agement capability of T1 
High: 
 Due to regular train-
ing of their farm ad-
visors, the T1 has a 
good understanding 
of T2 processes and 
is able to translate 
the buyer’s sustaina-
bility requirements 
for them.  
 T1 employs 35 of 
their own agrono-
mists who also cover 
sustainability man-
agement.  
 
High: 
 Capabilities for 
managing suppliers’ 
sustainability were 
initially built up by 
the buyer but sys-
tematically passed 
on to T1’s agrono-
mists.  
 T1 employs 250 of 
their own agrono-
mists who also cover 
sustainability man-
agement. 
High: 
 T1 are very active in 
developing their own 
sustainability man-
agement program 
and independently 
conduct audits at T2 
level.  
 T1 employs 20–30 
of their own agron-
omists who also 
cover sustainability 
management. 
High: 
 The T1 are highly 
advanced in their 
own sustainability 
programs and have 
developed the capa-
bility to manage 
suppliers’ sustaina-
bility and initiate 
sustainability im-
provement projects 
with them (e.g., life 
cycle analyses).  
 
Low: 
 Capabilities of T1 
suppliers are current-
ly not assessed to be 
high enough, but In-
tegris is making in-
vestments to build 
them up.  
Low: 
 Capabilities of T1 to 
manage sustainabil-
ity in their own facil-
ities have developed 
with growing experi-
ence with customer 
audits. Capabilities 
to manage sub-
suppliers are less de-
veloped, however, as 
the role of the sup-
plier sustainability 
manager is missing 
in the T1 organiza-
tion.  
Power asymmetry   Power relations are 
symmetrical: As 
complexity is high at 
the T2 level, the 
buyer is dependent 
on the T1 supplier if 
it wants to reach its 
sustainability target 
of sourcing 100% of 
its agricultural raw 
material sustainably 
by 2020.  
 The Dutch T1 had a 
broader customer 
base and was less 
sales-dependent on 
Sequenzia.  
 Power asymmetry 
exist as buyer is the 
most important cus-
tomer for the T1. 
Due to the complexi-
ty at the T2 level, the 
buyer is also de-
pendent on T2 to 
reach its sustainabil-
ity targets. 
 Power relations are 
quite symmetrical: 
Educata is a main 
customer for the T1 
but is not the most 
important one. 
 Power relations are 
symmetrical: Pack-
aging suppliers are 
large multi-national 
companies them-
selves and are hardly 
dependent on their 
buyers. As packag-
ing is not its core 
business, Educata is 
in fact dependent on 
its packaging suppli-
ers to realize the en-
vironmental sustain-
ability improve-
ments.  
 Power relations are 
asymmetrical: The 
buyer is very power-
ful as it accounts for 
a large share of their 
T1 suppliers sales 
volume. 
 Power asymmetries 
between the buyer 
and T1 are high and 
oftentimes even in-
creases towards the 
T2 level.   
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FIGURE 1 MSC of Sequenzia (Dairy Products and Tea Bags) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 MSC of Educata (Metal Cans) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T1 initiates 
sustainability 
projects 
together with 
T2.  
T2 
Buyer  
communicates 
sustainability 
targets.  
 
T1 
Buyer 
T1 regularly audits T2. 
Metal	Cans	(MC)	
T1”translates” 
code for 
animal 
husbandry and 
monitors the 
implemen-
tation of the 
code at the 
farmer’s level 
through audits 
and field 
books. 
T2 
Buyer 
formulates 
sustainable 
agricultural 
code.  
T1 
Buyer 
Buyer 
T1 
T2 
Assessment 
through third 
party 
organization 
(Rainforest 
Alliance).  
M 
Buyer trains 
T1 
agronomists 
with regard to 
Rainforest 
Alliance code. 
T1 carries out 
sustainability 
training for T2 
(i.e. lead 
farmers) 
together with 
third party 
organization. 
Dairy	Products	(DP)	 Tea	Bags	(TB)	
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FIGURE 3: MSC of Integris (Footwear/ Clothing) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: MSC of Electra (Consumer Electronics) 
 
 
 
 
Buyer directly 
audits major 
T2 suppliers 
every 3 years. 
Buyer 
T1 
T2 
Concrete targets 
and specific KPIs 
for sustainability 
are communicated 
directly to T2. 
Footwear	(FW)/Clothing	(CL)	
T2 
Buyer audits T1 every 3 
years. Responsibility of 
managing sustainability sub-
suppliers is specified as as 
an audit criterion for T1 
suppliers. 
T1 
Buyer 
T1 communicates 
sustainability code to 
T2 but does not audit 
for compliance. 
Consumer	Electronics	(CE)	
